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The Principal-Agent Question: the Chartered Trading Companies 
In assessing the efficiency properties of chartered trading companies, as the earliest 
examples of multinationals, an important issue was their need to obtain a high level 
of performance from decision-makers. The divorce of ownership from control and the 
distance of many operations from the European head offices of the f1I1l1S meant 
significant levels of responsibility had to be delegated to a managerial class. At the 
same time, remoteness made it difficult to measure and assess managerial 
performance. Steve Nicholas and Ann Carlos have argued that delegation to 
managerial agents had a critical impact upon their profitability: "the major problem 
facing the trading companies , therefore, was that of managing their managers at a 
distance". t They investigate the response of the companies to the agency question, 
identifying the incentive structures, morutoring systems, and behavioural mores 
adopted which, they believe, largely solved the problem. "For the Hudson' s Bay 
Company", they conclude, "agency was not a serious problem".2 We also believe 
that agency was a prevalent concern for the trading companies and that, aware of the 
matter, they adopted palliative measures . However, there are major difficulties in 
attenuating the costs of agency, particularly in the historical context of these 
companies, and the ineffectiveness of their solutions is confmned by extensive 
evidence of managerial malfeasance. Indeed, managerial opportunism seems to have 
been regarded as a largely unavoidable consequence of long distance trading and 
production in an era of poor commullications. 
A. M. Carlos and S. Nicholas , 'Agency Problems in Early Chartered 
Companies: the Case of the Hudson' s Bay Company', Journal of Economic History 
50,4, 1990, p. 855. 
A. M. Carlos and S. Nicholas , 'Managing the Manager: Computing Costs of 
Agency in the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1810', (Unpublished paper for Econorllic 
History Society of Australia and New Zealand Conference, July 1992, Department of 
Econorrllcs, Uruversity of Western Australia) , p. 13 . 
The Agency Problem 
A principal agent relationship exists whenever an owner (principal) delegates 
decision-malcing responsibility to another person (agent) .3 It is frequently applied to 
deal with the relationship between owner and manager in modem large scale 
businesses . The contract between the two is not a costless one since the principal will 
need to monitor carefully the agent's behaviour. In the conduct of his or her duties 
the agent will acquire information unknown to the principal . This information 
asymmetry creates a moral hazard which enables the agent to act opportunistically , 
that is in a manner inconsistent with the owner' s best interests . Opportunism can take 
various forms , from indolence to fraudulence, all of which involve a manager 
attempting to maximise his or her utility function in a manner inconsistent with the 
best interests of the firm . Principals develop methods of attenuating the costs of 
agency . Reducing the degree of delegated responsibility may be at odds with the 
needs of the organisation and bring with it increased costs elsewhere. Complex 
monitoring systems, a variety of individual and group incentives, and the fostering of 
a company ethos are the main devices employed. Monitoring increases the probability 
of detection, incentives raise the opportunity cost of opportunism, and a company 
ethos encourages loyal and honest behaviour. 
There are many impediments to the success of agency mitigation schemes. There 
must be a reasonable expectation that reduced agency costs will more than offset the 
costs of these policies . Successful monitoring requires effective reporting systems 
which convey wide ranging, regular, accurate and up to date information about the 
operations of the firm at a distance. Imperfect observation and measurement of 
manager performance can have negative consequences by influencing the agent' s 
For an introduction to the principal-agent relationship see: N. Strong and M. 
Waterson, 'Principals, Agents , and Information' , in R. Clarke and T. McGuinness 
(eds) The Economics of the Firm (Oxford, 1987), pp. 18-61. K. Arrow, 'The 
Economics of Agency', in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser (eds) Principals arui Agents: the 
Structure of Business (Boston, 1984), pp. 27-51. 
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behaviour. For example, if output quantities only can be observed this may lead to 
a decline in qUality. The agent will generally be reluctant to share superior 
information with the principal because it will inhibit his or her rent-gathering potential 
and may attempt to distort information-gathering procedures as a defence mechanism. 
Reporting systems may convey accurate information but it must be interpreted under 
conditions of uncertainty arising from trade fluctuations. The structure of 
decision-making may also complicate monitoring particularly in larger companies with 
greater managerial specialization and interdependent teamwork. Mutual monitoring 
among agents may appear to work but is likely to produce additional costs of 
over-monitoring .' Cooperation among agents may make effeclive monitoring almost 
impossible. Irrespective of the quality of the information received, the ftrm must have 
in place a centralised structure capable of rapid and intelligent interpretation of such 
information and able to act upon it. 
The main drawback in establishing incentive structures is the difficulty of relating 
rewards to output. Teamwork and imperfect information emphasise the extent of the 
problem. Even where individual work can be observed through efficient monitoring 
systems the level and nature of incentives necessary to mitigate opportunism depends 
upon the opportunity cost which must vary over time and between individuals . This 
creates a series of unique situations which makes accurate contracting, based upon 
precedent, very difficult. The difficulties of designing an appropriate package of 
incentives are reflected in a lack of consensus in the theoretical literature between the 
relative merits of promotion and bonus-based incentives and, more broadly , between 
monetary and non-monetary rewards .5 Monetary incentives can lead to a decline in 
qual ity and encourage a narrow focus on completing particular tasks quickly and with 
G. P. Baker, M. C. Jensen and K. J . Murphy, 'Compensalion and Incentives : 
Practice vs Theory' , Journal of Finance, 43 , 3, 1988, p. 606. 
Ibid, pp . 594-5 , 600-1 
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little exercise of risk or initiative. Non-monetary rewards , such as praise and 
reputation, overcome this problem but are highly reliant upon close and regular 
interaction between principal and agent. 
Modem contract theory , particularly relational and implicit contracting, allows for the 
fact that there is much in an agreement which is subject to regular change or cannot 
be formalised in a specific document. Incomplete contracts necessarily vest managers 
with discretion which can be used to acquire rents. Implicit contract theory recognises 
that an employment contract will generally be unable to deal explicitly with all aspects 
of a relationship in a formal manner.6 Thus, contracting can be highly complex and 
varied in nature and this is primarily a consequence of uncertainty . Writing and 
regularly revising complex and individualised employment contracts is a costly 
exercise . WilIiamson has argued that complex contractual relations require 
governance structures with superior adaptive properties . 7 The nature of these 
structures and how they are adaptive is not made clear in the theoretical literature but 
evidently such flexibility must be based upon sound information flows about the 
performance and role of the contracting parties and an ability to interpret and act upon 
this information. 
The apparent ineffectiveness of incentive structures and monitoring systems has led 
Herbert Simon to argue that there are, ' other powerful motivations that induce 
S. Rosen, ' Implicit Contracts: a Survey ' , Journal of Economic Literature 23 , 
1985, pp. 1144-1175, reprinted in S. Rosen (ed. ) Implicit Contract Theory 
(Aldershot, 1994), pp. 382-413. 
o. E. WilIiamson, 'Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of 
Contractual Relations ', Journal of Law and Economics 22, 1979, p. 239 
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employees to accept organizational goals and authority as bases for their actions ' . 8 
Notions of pride, loyalty, docility, and identification all discourage opportunism. It 
is open to discussion how far such values can be inculcated into an individual rather 
than being intrinsic to their personality in the first place. It may also be doubted 
whether 'most human beings are gifted with a considerable measure of docility ' 9 
The appropriate level of docility would require some element of fostering by the firm , 
which would not be costless, and would probably only work under specific conditions 
particularly where there is close and regular interaction within the enterprise . While 
docility and conformity may be appropriate values in an unskilled workforce, a fmn 
may expect somewhat different behavioural values from managers frequently based 
upon individualism and initiative. 
Agency Mitigation by the Chartered Trading Companies 
i) Contracts and Incentives 
Carlos and Nicholas provide evidence of incentives established by several trading 
companies , noting that, 'the principals wrote a generous employment contract for their 
managers' .10 Governors of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) located in North 
America periodically eamed £50-£200 per annum while £100 was common amongst 
its managers . 11 The Agent-General of the Royal African Company (RAC) received 
H. Sirnon, 'Organizations and Markets ', Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 
2, 1991 , p. 34. 
Ibid , p. 36. 
\0 A. Carlos and S. Nicholas, , "Giants of an Earlier Capitalism": the Chartered 
Trading Companies as Modem Multinationals' , Business History Review 62, 1998, 
p.414. 
11 Carlos and Nicholas , 'Agency Problems ', pp . 862, 867. 
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between £400 and £1000 and middle managers £200.12 Carlos argues that wages 
paid by the RAC included a non-compensating wage differential which, in terms of 
wage efficiency modelling, promoted employee compliance. \3 Generous gratuities 
and bonuses as high as 50 to 100 per cent of annual salary were offered to employees 
of the HBC; in the RAC the Agent-General was paid a £200 gratuity though evidence 
of similar generosity to middle managers has not been uncovered. 14 Bonds were 
lodged by company managers; these ranged typically between £300 and £2000 , those 
in the RAC were about ten times the annual salary . Bonds were higher for those in 
the more senior and responsible posts and so were increased with promotion. IS 
Oaths agreeing not to pursue private trade were common with penalties for their 
breach including reprimand , loss of the bond, or dismissal . 
Comparatively little information on incentives has been unearthed and mostly relates 
to the leading figures . However, many more minor servants were also in a position 
to act opportunistically. Salary levels provided by Nicholas and Carlos were not 
particularly high in comparison with similar occupations. Indeed, £40 for a chief 
12 Carlos and Nicholas , , "Giants of an Earlier Capitalism"', p . 414; A. Carlos, 
'Agent Opportunism and the Role of Company Culture: the Hudson' s Bay and the 
Royal African Companies Compared' , Business and Economic History 20, 1991 , pp . 
145-6. There is some inconsistency between the salaries reported in these two papers 
\3 A. M. Carlos, 'Bonding and the Agency Problem: Evidence from the Royal 
Africa Company, 1672-91 ', Explorations in Economic History 31 , 1994, pp . 317-22. 
14 Carlos and Nicholas, 'Agency Problems ', pp. 862, 867; CarIos , 'Agent 
Opportunism', p. 146. 
I S Carlos and Nicholas , ' Agency Problems ' , p. 864; Carlos , ' Agent Opportunism', 
p. 146. 
6 
factor would seem low. 16 Factors' salaries in the English East India Company 
(EEIC) in the seventeenth century varied from as little as £10 to £150 or £250 per 
annum.17 Shipmasters employed in private shipping firms could expect to earn in the 
overseas trades in the region of £6- 10 per month plus additional benefits in the form 
of freight allowances and free board and lodgings both on board and ashore. 18 HBC 
masters and crew earned no more than prevailing occupational rates. 19 Relating 
incentive structures to individual performance has been cited as a general problem. 
Charles Bayly was paid the apparently generous salary of £200 by the HBC and yet 
was still sent home accused of private trading in 1674.20 We are unconvinced by the 
assertion of Carlos and Nicholas that, 'in comparison to a list of wages for British 
workers, the managers were well paid' . 2 1 The reference is to Williamson's 
calculations of British pay structures which indicate that engineers and lawyers were 
16 H. Innis , The Fur Trade in Canada (New Haven, CN, 1930), p. 130. F. P. 
Robinson, The Trade of the East India Company, 1709-/813 (Cambridge, 1912), p. 
63 cites complaints of impoverislunent by company servants in Bombay in 1768. 
17 K. N. Chaudhuri , The English East India Company. The Study of an Early Joint 
Stock Company (London, 1965), pp. 83-4. 
18 S. Ville, English Shipowning in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1987) , 
pp. 80-3; R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1962), pp. 138-9. 
19 Ville ,English Shipowning , pp. 80-3, 164-8; Davis , English Shipping Industry, 
pp. 133-45 ; Innis , Fur Trade, pp. 130, 158. As late as 1768 the seamen of the HBC 
went on strike for improved wages. 
20 D. MacKay, The Honourable Company: A History of the Hudson 's Bay 
Company (London, 1937) , p. 48 
21 Carlos and Nicholas , 'Agency Problems', p. 862. 
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generally paid more than most senior trading company officials.22 Historians of the 
trading companies view salaries as poor and believe that private trade was an early 
form of 'moonlighting' to supplement their modest living .23 
There is little to suggest that wages contained a non-compensating differential . Wage 
levels, which we have argued were unexceptional, were mostly determined by 
seniority, length of service, and skills . Living conditions in, for example, Africa and 
northern Canada, were such that higher salaries were more likely to reflect a risk 
premium. Many companies experienced recruitment and retention problems, a 
solution to which would have been to raise wages. Perhaps the weakest aspect of the 
case for an efficiency wage is the simplistic assertion that there was an excess of 
supply over demand for labour, "on various occasions more people are listed as 
having applied for the position than hired" . 24 One might expect this to be the norm 
for many managerial positions. 
How effective were bonds and oaths as instruments of employee control? The 
companies called home suspected opportunists for questioning and took appropriate 
subsequent action. Such punishment might be viewed as a normal part of an 
employee-employer relationship. Nicholas and Carlos have noted: "We have found 
22 J . WilI iamson, 'Structure of Pay in Britain, 1710-1911 ', in Research In 
Economic History, 7, 1982, p. 48. 
23 G. M. Anderson, R. E. McCormick and R. D. Tollison, 'The Economic 
Organization of the English East lndia Company' , Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 4, 1983, p. 228; H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 
1600-1800 (Minneapolis , 1976), p. 227; O. Prakash, The Dutch East India Company 
and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720 (Princeton, NJ , 1985), p. 84; T. S. Willan , 
The Early History of the Russia Company (Manchester, 1956) , pp. 36-7; K. G. 
Davies, The Royal Africa Company (London, 1957), pp. 253-4. 
24 Carlos , 'Bonding and the Agency Problem' , p. 322. 
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little evidence that those bonds were forfeited, implying that they were successful in 
reducing opportunism. "25 Likewise, we have found no evidence of forfeiture but 
suggest that bonds were therefore an ineffective control mechanism. Instead, they 
were used to obtain fmancial restitution in the event of misappropriation or false 
accounting. 
ii) Monitoring and Internal Controls 
Commercial information was used to monitor managers from a distance. From 
accounts and correspondence, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) built up 
information dealing with stock levels , advances, debts, credits, the composition of 
trade, and cost price data .26 The HBC attempted to standardise trading values in 
terms of a 'beaver standard' and relied on an 'overplus ' or balancing item when gift 
exchange and other more random transactions complicated the picture 27 Interpreting 
such information and acting upon it was the responsibility of company committees. 
The correspondence sub-committees of the East India companies are seen as playing 
an important role through their tasks of reading and replying to all letters and 
reports .28 Direct observation occurred through mutual monitoring and by ship 
searches conducted by 'waiters ' who were paid a proportion of any smuggled goods 
which were detected 29 
25 Carlos and Nicholas , ' Agency Problems ', p. 864. 
26 Carlos and Nicholas , ' "Giants of an Earlier Capitalism"', pp. 407-8 . 
27 Carlos and Nicholas, ' Agency Problems ', pp . 867-71. 
28 Carlos and Nicholas , '''Giants of an Earlier Capitalism"', p. 408 , Carlos and 
Nicholas, ' Agency Problems ', pp. 870 . 
29 Carlos and Nicholas , ' Agency Problems ', pp . 865-7, 874; Carlos , 'Agent 
Opportunism' , p. 147 
9 
We would be circumspect about the value of long distance infonnation in identifying 
agent opportunism. In an era of slow and irregular conununications questions must 
be raised about the extent to which such information had become obsolete by the time 
it reached key decision-makers in Europe. As the companies expanded this problem 
became worse . There is little evidence of a system of regular reporting and in some 
cases the main information flows occurred only annUally. Accuracy and the nature 
of information were equally important. Information exchanges were primarily 
concerned with conunercial policy particularly in terms of the type of trade goods 
required beyond Europe and the state of the market in imported produce. Even in this 
respect information was incomplete; the RAC, for example, kept a book record of 
auction but not contract sales .3O The accounting methods of the companies have been 
variously criticised. The VOC lacked cost-price calculations and simply set costs 
against total sales without showing the price of imports and exports . 3) In the case 
of the EEIC it has been suggested that much of the correspondence was concerned 
with political rather than conunercial matters , reflecting the company 's functional 
duality .32 Information was deliberately distorted by managers . Jerome Horsey , a 
Russia Company employee, falsified inventories and kept company goods himself.33 
WilIiam Jersey , an accountant with the EEIC in Pegu, was dismissed twice by the 
30 Davies , Royal Africa Company, p. 361. 
3) F. Gaastra, 'The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company ', 
in L. Blusse and F . Gaastra (eds) Companies and Trade (The Hague, 1981) , p. 54. 
32 Furber, Rival Empires , p. 199. 
33 Willan, Russia Company, p. 207. 
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company .34 
The complex and uncertain nature of international trading provided many opportunities 
for misinformation. The numerous and fluctuating Indian currencies complicated 
international transactions as did inaccurate measurement and weighing .35 The prices 
of many imported and exported commodities were highly volatile; muscovado sugar 
imported from Barbados fluctuated between 16s and 54s, 1674-96 36 Freight rates 
could be similarly volatile. 37 The frauds committed by Hugh Barker of the EEIC in 
1736 arose from imperfect price information on silk imports . 38 Such uncertainty in 
the terms of trade provided scope for collusive fraudulence between company 
employees and local traders many of whom worked closely together. Company policy 
of gift giving and sanctioned bribery provided even more scope for opportunistic 
' trimming ' by local managers .39 Even though gifts and bribes might be recorded in 
the account books the amounts would have been extremely difficult to verify. 
34 Furber, Rival Empires , p. 270. 
35 Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 196-7. S. Ville. 'The Problem of Tonnage 
Measurement in the English Shipping Industry, 1780-1830', International Journal of 
Maritime History , 1, 2, 1989, pp. 74-6 highlights the bribery of coal meters by 
shipowners in order to overstate delivery volumes by substantial amounts. 
36 Davies , Royal Africa Company , p. 366. Davies , Royal Africa Company, p. 
356. 
37 Ville, English Shipowning , p. 172. 
38 K.N. Chaudhuri , The Trading world of Asia and the English East India 
Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1978) p. 357 . 
39 Chaudhuri , Trading World, p. 125 suggests large sums were involved in official 
bribery by the English East India Company. 
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Attempts by the HBC to overcome such problems by establishing a fonnal exchange 
rate between trade exports and imported beaver skins appears unconvincing as a 
monitoring tool . This rate remained unchanged for many years in spite of the fact that 
the terms of trade must have fluctuated . This fluctuation was allowed for in the 
accounts by an 'overplus', measuring the saving in export goods from an improvement 
in the tenns of trade. It would still remain difficult, however, for company officers 
in Europe to detect the true reasons for such fluctuations . Nicholas and Carlos 
attribute favourable movements to quality shading in such products as cloth, brandy, 
and tobacco. This deceived the local lndian population, and must have been hard to 
monitor back in Europe. A contemporary trader, Joseph La France, wrote in 1742: 
... the governors add to the price of their goods, exact many more furs 
from the natives than is required by the standard, and sometimes pay 
them not equally for furs of the same value. This they call the profit of 
the over-plus trade, part of which they always add to the Company's 
stock for the sake of enhancing the merit of their services, and apply the 
remainder to their own use, which is often expended in bribes to skreen 
their faults and continue them in their command.4O 
A company report of 1812 recommended replacing the standard with a system of 
accounts current which, 'would considerably improve the value of your returns, and 
shew you at once the trader who is most worthy of being prompted or rewarded' .41 
How did the companies use and act upon infonnation received? Nicholas and Carlos 
draw attention to the large volume of infonnation generated by the companies but give 
little indication of how it was used . Others suggest that the companies may have been 
overburdened by the detail and suffered from diseconornies of infonnation. Davies 
observes that the RAC made little attempt to "digest or summarise the infonnation", 
40 Innis , Fur Trade, p. 146. In addition , since the prices of articles varied between 
outposts there was little value in making such comparisons. Ibid , pp. 147-8. 
41 Ibid, p. 166. 
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Mackay shows that the HBC' s London Head Office sometimes took two years to 
provide decisions to the outposts on urgent mallers. 42 Furber's comments on the 
VOC are particularly striking: 
There is no doubt whatever that hundreds of pages sent home were never 
even read. Anyone working among the company's records at the Dutch 
National Archives is likely to open a volume to fmd thousands of grains 
of sand used to blot the ink lying undisturbed between its pages.43 
The infrequent arrival of large volumes of company accounts accentuated problems of 
information processing . Where information from overseas was carefully checked 
suspicion might fall upon company employees but proving a case against an individual 
could be difficult and often not worth the time and effort. Willan suggests that the 
Russia Company was unable to fmd adequate evidence to act against many employees 
strongly suspected of private trading .44 
Direct monitoring through vessel searches removed the problems of distance and time 
but was fraught with deception and bribery. Davies believes that searches conducted 
by the RAC were largely ineffective and gives the example of slaves written off as 
dead being landed in the West Indies before the company 's agents came aboard 45 
Furber suggest that there were many points on the French coast where illegal cargoes 
could be landed , while Glamarm argues that the growth in the size of company fleets 
42 Davies, Royal Africa Company , p. lll ; Mackay , Honourable Company, p. 
134. 
43 Furber, Rival Empires, p. 191. 
44 Willan , Russia Company, p. 203 . 
45 Davies, Royal Africa Company , p. llO . 
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in the eighteenth century, arriving together, made the task of searching more 
difficult.46 By delegating monitoring to relatively minor officials the companies ran 
the risk of collusive opportunism and bribery .47 
iii) Company culture 
The conscious or sub-conscious development of corporate cultures by the HBC and 
RAC are examined by Carlos and Nicholas : "The directors defInitely tried to create 
a social system in which the managers and workers were made to feel pan of a 
family".48 They argue that in the case of the HBC pensions, positive encouragement, 
a socially or geographically homogeneous workforce, and the fostering of a moral 
code created an atmosphere of honesty and loyalty .49 The ephemeral RAC fail ed to 
do likewise because of short term employment profiles and the openness of the 
environment which increased the opportunity for corruption. 50 
Evidence of the growth of corporate cultures is highly tenuous . Close and regular 
interaction was impossible in long distance trading companies of this era. Carlos and 
46 Furber, Rival Empires , p. 142; K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1720 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 239. 
47 See the example provided in footnote 53 . Carlos, 'Bonding and the Agency 
Problem', p. 327 alternatively gives an example of a chief mate's abortive attempt to 
bribe a waiter. Naturally, such failed attempts are more likely to have come to light 
than the successful ones . 
48 Carlos and Nicholas , ' Agency Problems' , pp. 873 . They differ in view between 
their articles as to whether corporate cultures were imposed by the fInn or developed 
subconsciously . 
49 Ibid , pp. 872-4. 
50 Carlos, 'Agent Opportunism' , p. 149-50. 
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Nicholas allege positive encouragement was replete in company correspondence but 
no examples are provided. Their little homilies were insufficient to prevent desertion, 
drunkenness , and gross immorality on a grand scale. Fostering a family atmosphere 
was at odds with encouraging servants to monitor each other and report 
misdemeanours. Innis provides evidence for the absence of an esprit de corps in the 
HBC at the end of the eighteenth century.51 The genocidal aftennath of the wrecking 
of the VOC's vessel , Batavia, on the Abrolhos Islands in 1629 also contradicts notions 
of a cooperative company culture.52 It remains unproven that the HBC sought or 
were able to recruit an homogeneous workforce and a managerial class with a shared 
set of values. Recruitment from Christ's Hospital reflected the educational attainments 
of these boys and, as a single source, minimised recruitment costs . The recruitment 
of Orcadians was linked to their familiarity with extremely cold climates and the 
position of the Orkneys on the northern route to North America. In 1812, Colin 
Robertson, who had been hired to recommend improvements to the operations of the 
HBC , wrote of the unsuitability of Orkneymen who only joined the company as a last 
resort and left once they had earned sufficient money.53 Nor was an homogeneous 
workforce necessarily a loyal or industrious one. The overseas workforce may have 
held common group values, but if these were different from those of the directors in 
London, this might create a hostile culture, prone to collusive opportunism. Wartime 
payments of injury and death pensions were intended to keep men at their posts at 
dangerous times rather than a means of fostering a family environment. Some private 
shipowners paid their principal captains retainers and offered pensions on retirement 
51 Innis , Fur Trade , p. 158. 
52 A stimulating account of these events and the archaeological discoveries which 
they yielded is provided in H. Edwards , Islands of Angry Ghosts (London , 1966) . 
53 Innis, Fur Trade, p. 165. 
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or death as a means of retaining their services . 54 
Evidence of Persistent Opportunism 
Historians of the trading companies provide extensive primary evidence of 
opportunism and conclude that it was a major problem which did not decline, indeed 
may have increased, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . For 
the EEIC, Chaudhuri noted, ' the Company was never able to solve satisfactorily the 
difficult task of controlling the officials in Asia and extracting compliance to its 
orders' .55 Davies noted the ' lethargy and dishonesty ' of officials and Wood, ' a rich 
crop of abuses ' in the Levant Company.56 Governors, chief agents , and company 
ambassadors were all convicted of corruption. In 1734 Sir Robert Cowan was 
dismissed as governor of Bombay for the EEIC on a charge of corruption.57 
Dishonesty was often the result of collusion among company servants , and with former 
employees, local merchants , and even local rulers. In 1626 George Willoughby, on 
returning from India, informed the EEIC of a, 'notorious abuse' committed in 
collusion by three of its factors , ' to the exceeding loss and prejudice of the 
Company' .58 The companies were defrauded both in the disposal of their goods and 
the procurement of return commodities . Incorrect invoice returns and the substitution 
of different grades of the same commodity meant both quantity and quality 
54 VilIe, English Shipowning , p. 74 . 
55 Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 40. 
56 Davies, Royal Africa Company, p. 165; A. C. Wood , A History of the Levant 
Company (London, 1964), p. 56. 
57 Chaudhuri , Trading World, p. 212. 
58 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, p. 87. 
16 
manipulation was involved. Embezzlement of non-traded company goods and assets 
and unsanctioned borrowing from the fIrms also occurred. One example of each type 
of fraud may be given from a very long list of recorded incidents. A VOC director 
in Bengal sold company goods to a merchant in return for a 20 or 30 per cent 
commission when he could have sold them to others for a higher price .59 Russia 
Company vessels returned with poor quality furs and incomplete cargoes. 60 EEIC 
employees regularly embezzled military stores .6 1 
Possibly the most prevalent form of opportunism was private trading. Furber has 
claimed that nearly all Europeans living in the East Indies before the nineteenth 
century were living a double life, working for a company and developing their own 
private trade. 62 The loss of employee effort to the company was clear enough but 
it could also mean product quality substitution between company and private trade, 
securing the best price agreements for themselves , and taking up cargo space on board 
vessel. Shipmasters deliberately acted in a dilatory manner so that they would miss 
the return season to Europe and remain in south-east Asia where they could participate 
in the country trade where involvement of the EEIC was negligible particularly after 
the middle of the seventeenth century. 63 By contrast, 'private English traders 
constituted by far the largest and most enduring group of Europeans engaged in the 
59 Prakash, Dutch East India Company, p. 83. 
60 Wi11an, Russia Company, p. 78 . 
61 Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 200-1 . 
62 Ibid, p. 66 . 
63 Ibid, pp. 279-80. 
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trade of the Indian Ocean and the South China Seas' . 64 One contemporary viewed 
the private trade of employees of the VOC from Bengal as being as great as the 
official trade . 65 The companies appeared ambivalent towards private trade. 
Recognising that it could serve as an incentive structure but also cut into company 
business , they periodically banned and permitted it. The VOC allowed its servants 
some 'privilege tonnage' by which they could bring home a certain amount of tea on 
their own account. Anderson et al have viewed the privileged tonnage as the most 
important form of incentive structure for ship masters. 66 However, such privileges 
were regularly violated and exceeded on a large scale. It has been estimated that a 
half of the private trade in tea by VOC employees in the middle of the eighteenth 
century was unsanctioned. 67 Nor did opportunism decline over time in response to 
counter measures by the companies . In the 1750s, three-quarters of a century after 
outlawing it, the HBC was still suffering from private trade which included ship 
masters and local governors smuggling out furs for private profit. 68 As late as 1786, 
Sir Archibald Campbell arrived in Madras as the new governor for the EEIC and 
began investigations which revealed that the company's service was riddled with 
corruption 69 
64 O. M. Prakash, ' India and the Indian Ocean Maritime Trading Network, 
1500-1800' (unpublished paper of New Directions in Maritime History Conference, 
University of Western Australia, (993), pp. 11 -12. 
65 Prakash, Dutch East India Company , p. 84. 
66 Anderson et ai , 'Economic Organization', pp. 233-4. 
67 Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic, pp. 237-8. 
68 Mackay, Honourable Company, pp . 101-2. 
69 Furber, Rival Empires, pp . 200-1. 
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Modelling Managerial Opportunism 
It is more difficult to evaluate the significance of employee opportunism to company 
performance. Davies argues that, ' it is impossible to estimate even approximately how 
much the company [RAC] lost by the frauds of its agents and factors' .70 Some 
writers have viewed employee activities as relevant to the difficulties or downfall of 
companies. Prakash believes employee action 'contributed significantly' to the VOC's 
problems, while Wood suggests it did more than anything to destroy the Levant 
Company's prosperity by 1660.71 The EEIC attempted to mitigate private trading 
when it realised the serious impact it was having upon the fum's business . Carlos and 
Nicholas attempt to model managerial opportunism in the HBC in 1810.72 While we 
welcome the bold methodology as probably the first historical application of an agency 
model, we believe that the model is technically flawed and inappropriately appJied. 73 
The intention of the model is to show what proportions of total potential profit accrue 
to the Company (the principal) and the manager (the agent). The expected net revenue 
for the company (RJ and for the agent (RJ are expressed as follows: 
R.: = sR - am2 - pI 
Ra = b(l -s)R + pI 
70 Davies, RoyaL Africa Company, p. Ill . 
71 Prakash, Dutch East India Company, p. 83; Wood, Levant Company, p. 56. 
72 A. M. Carlos and S. Nicholas, 'Managing the manager: an Application of the 
Principal Agent Model to the Hudson's Bay Company', Oxford Economic Papers , 45 , 
1993 . 
73 For a detailed critique of its specification and a modified solution of the Carlos-
Nicholas model , see M. Casson, S. lones , and S. ViIle, 'Modelling Agency in the 
Hudson's Bay Company: a Critique' , Discussion Papers in Economics, University of 
Reading, 1995 . 
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where R is total expected revenue from trade, I the salary, s the proportion of official 
trade, 1-s the proportion of private managerial trade, m the level of monitoring, p the 
probability of trade remaining undetected . a is a coefficient of the cost of monitoring 
and b a coefficient for measuring the degree of agent inefficiency compared with the 
company. The net revenue for the company is calculated by deducting the cost of 
monitoring and agent salaries from the total revenue of official trade . Agent income 
is the revenue generated from private trade plus salary. They introduce a third 
equation which derives a relationship between the probability of non-detection, p, the 
level of monitoring, rn, and managerial trade, (1-s): 
p = 1-(1-s)2rn . 
This provides a substitute for p in solving R,. and Rc. Differentiation is then used to 
obtain optimal values for I, rn, and s . From these sets of equations, R,. and Rc can 
now both be solely expressed in terms of sR, I, and p which is what the authors 
require since they have historic values of 1810 for sR and I together with a 
hypothesised value for p. With an sR value of £25 977, I of £2690 and (1-p) of 0.8 
the total expected profits are £30 819 of which the company took 78 .2 per cent and 
the managers 15 .7 per cent with the balance taken up by inefficiency and the costs of 
monitoring . Reducing the probability of detection to 0.6 only marginally affects the 
result with 77 .8 per cent of profits going to the company and 14.2 per cent to the 
manager. 74 The full costs of agency include inefficiency and monitoring, as well as 
the manager's return . 10 this case, therefore, agency costs were 21 .8 to 22.2 per cent 
of total returns . On the basis of their interpretation of these results , Carlos and 
Nicholas conclude that the agency problem had been solved by 1810. 
While the intention of the model is to measure the total gains to the managers and the 
losses to the company from opportunism it only captures the gains and losses of 
private trading . A second limitation of the model is that it simply attempts to measure 
74 Ibid, p. 247-52 
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the revenue generated by the division of trade between the company and its managers . 
It teUs us nothing about the profit achieved by either party . By their own admission 
the fixed costs facing the company are ignored, as are many of the variable costs. 
How effective is the model, though, in measuring private trade? We believe that the 
expression of p in terms of (l-s) and m is incorrect. We question whether p can be 
expressed in terms of s. While we might expect the probability of detection to 
increase with monitoring levels, though perhaps to a diminishing degree, it is much 
less evident that they rose with the increased proportion of private trade . Whilst 
increased private trade will lead to increased levels of detection it will not affect rates 
of detection . No matter how many times a manager attempts to smuggle private trade 
in the course of a year, the probability of his being detected , ceteris paribus, will not 
rise unless the level of monitoring does . Hypothetically, therefore, the relationship 
seems unfounded . If, in this particular example, we can equate levels and rates of 
detection there is no explanation as to why a squared value of (l-s) is employed. 
Without a squared value there would be no remaining value once p had been 
differentiated in terms of S in attempting to solve It. and Rc- Nor is it clear that any 
relationship between p and (l-s) is consistent over all values. At low levels of private 
trade , the probability of detection might change very little but at higher levels rise 
sharply. Carlos and Nicholas tell us that this relationship is based upon historical 
evidence although none is provided and we are not aware of any . Thus, there appears 
to be no clear or consistent relationship between p and (l-s) . It is perhaps 
symptomatic of their confusion that they appear to contradict themselves later in the 
paper by arguing that, ' the probability of detection depends both on the level of 
monitoring and the environment in which the trade is conducted' .75 They do not 
attempt to model their imprecise notions of a closed environment which might increase 
detection rates . 
75 Carlos and Nicholas , ' Managing the Manager' , p. 253 . 
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The parameters a and b measure the cost of monitoring and the (in)efficiency of 
private relative to official trade, respectively. There are no historical values available 
for either parameter. Therefore, they simulate the costs of agency by using parameter 
values for a and b between 0.2 and 0.8. No a values above 0.8 are provided although 
they admit it would be possible to have values greater than 1. Of greater concern, 
though, is their unwillingness to accept that b could be greater than I and therefore 
private trade more efficient than that of the company. While private trade incurred 
additional costs from smuggling and surreptitiously supplying the market, managers 
benefited from superior information, particularly in the procurement of goods , which 
lowered their variable costs relative to those of the frrm . They also had lower 
establishment costs , being able to free-ride by using the firm's time, trading posts , 
shipping space, and commercial information at little expense. Indeed, as we noted 
earlier, free-riding and preferential treatment were likely to tilt the balance of relative 
efficiency between the two modes even further. On this basis, we would suggest that 
the private trader was in a position to operate more efficiently than the firm and 
therefore b should have a value greater than 1. This represents a major problem for 
Carlos and Nicholas since their is model is especially sensitive to variations in b. 
Aside from its limited scope and technical flaws , the manner in which the model is 
applied is problematic. Concentration upon a single year rather than providing a 
longitudinal comparison inevitably limits its comparative value. It tells us nothing 
about the extent of the agency problem in the HBC' s early years in spite of the authors 
claim that an agency problem had existed and was solved by the introduction of 
control measures at some point in the company' s history . If the problem was solved 
we know nothing of its historical sequence whether it was a sudden, gradual , 
intermittent, or cyclical process . Equally, it provokes questions concerning the 
representativeness of the year chosen. In fact , the choice of 1810 could not have been 
more unfortunate . It fell in the middle of the French Wars when the profitability of 
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shipping and overseas trade was known to be highly volatile. 16 
By re framing their equations Carlos and Nicholas were able to derive 1810 values for 
agent and company 'profit' in terms of sR, I, and p . However, while there is 
historical data for salaries and company sales revenue, nothing exists for the 
probability of detection. Instead, they 'infer' a value for p from qualitative evidence 
on monitoring levels and the trade environment contained in the HBC archives. We 
are told that direct and indirect monitoring took place but there is no indication of how 
many were caught in a single fleet, year or series of years. It is clear that evidence 
has not been unearthed of the precision to derive a figure for modelling the probability 
of detection. Their guess of 0.8 is extremely high; if the probability of being detected 
was 80 per cent this in itself would have prevented almost all private trade, something 
we know not to have happened. Even 0.6 which they use in a sensitivity analysis is 
too high . On the basis of our scepticism regarding control systems we would choose 
a much lower figure, say 0 .1. This ought to result in a larger share of profit going 
to the agent and a smaller one to the company. To our surprise, the model provided 
the opposite result: agent share of profit collapsed from 14-16 per cent to only 8.76 
per cent while company profit rose from 77-78 per cent to 80.01 per cent. If the 
probability of detection is reduced to zero, that private trade was never stopped, agent 
profit falls further to 7.9 per cent and company profit rises further to 80.25. This is 
a remarkable contradiction of Carlos and Nicholas 's assertion that direct and indirect 
monitoring systems introduced by the company helped attenuate agency. Instead , the 
model predicts that these systems made the problem worse! By setting the probability 
of detection at a maximum of one we fmd that agent profit rises to 17.16 per cent and 
that of the company falls to 78 .55 . 
In order to try and understand why this should happen it is necessary to show the 
16 Ville, English Shipowning , ch. 6. 
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equations reframed in tenns of sR, I, and p , something which Nicholas and Carlos 
omit from their paper. Thus: 
R,. = I(2-P) 
Rc = sR-I(1I2-P) 
It takes little imagination to realise that neither of these equations are going to provide 
the outcomes expected . With respect to agent profit, R,. , we would expect that 
reducing the probability of detection would increase profit or increasing detection rates 
would reduce profits. As we saw above, the outcome is exactly the opposite . 
Similarly , the limitations of the model mean that any increase in agent salaries, other 
things remaining the same, will necessarily increase the agent's share of profit rather 
than reduce it by discouraging opportunism. Thus, if we use Carlos and Nicholas 's 
original figures including a detection rate of 0 .8 but increase agent salaries from £2690 
to £4000 we find that the agent's share rises to 20.7 per cent and that of the company 
falls to 71.25. This would appear significant since their estimate for salaries appears 
to be somewhat conservative.77 
Equally surprising is the fact that the agent's profit is independent of the level of trade 
and can only flucruate between one and two times the salary level: 
I < R.< 21 
because 0 < P < 1 
In relation to Rc we fmd, contrary to our expectations , that it rises when the 
probability of detection falls and vice-versa. In addition, it is constrained within the 
limits of company sales revenue plus or minus half agent salaries: 
(sR-I/2) < Rc < (sR + 112) 
because 0 < P < 1 
77 See Casson, Jones and Ville, ' Modelling Agency ' . 
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The other two components of agency costs , inefficiency and monitoring , are also 
independent of the level or value of trade and closely constrained: 
Inefficiency = pI and thus in the region 0 to I 
Monitoring = 112 
Moreover, since we have no historic values for private trade and the model limits 
agent profit, unrealistically , to a maximum of double salary we are unable to show a 
large percentage return to the agent. Equally, total agency costs are limited to two and 
a half times salary . The fact that only R, is reliant on the level and value of trade 
makes the model inflexible. In addition, since agent profit and inefficiency are 
influenced in the opposite direction by p, the result of changes in the probability of 
detection is simply to shift the balance of agency costs between these two categories 
with very little impact on company profit. Thus, increasing detection rates would 
appear as of little consequence for the companies. If the original equation p = 
1-(1-s)2ru had been rejected, as we suggested above, it would have been impossible to 
express agent costs in terms of only salary and detection rates and the model could not 
have been calibrated in the absence of historical data on private trade . It is unlikely, 
of course, that we would have values for private trade given its clandestine nature; the 
same problem confronts historians of smuggling. We are also sceptical about the 
manner in which the authors derive an historic figure for sR. sR is calculated by 
deducting total sales revenue from the value of trade goods . While this net figure may 
be affected by agent opportunism it might equally be the consequence of changed 
trading conditions. In their example, if the company's trade revenue is halved then 
the firm 's share of profits falls from 78 per cent to 64 and that of the agent rises from 
15 to 26. However, we need to be able to distinguish whether this was primarily due 
to agent opportunism or a downturn in markets. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the chartered trading companies faced considerable control problems 
in operating multinationally in a period of slow and irregular communications and 
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with few organizational precedents on which to base their actions. We agree with 
Carlos and Nicholas that the companies were aware of the problem and made some 
attempts to respond to it. However, the general constraints in mitigating agency 
costs and the particular problems of the historical context have inclined us to a 
more circumspect few of the outcome. Extensive primary evidence confirms that 
managerial opportunism continued to be a major problem for the companies. There 
is no indication from the companies that they solved the problem indeed their 
continual modification of control policies suggests the opposite . Modelling the 
impact of agency costs on profitability provides an interesting methodological 
exercise but in its current form produces results which are too constrained and in 
fact contradict the predicted outcome. 
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